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The situation of Southeast Asian 
refugees has moved into another 
phase, and possibly the final phase, in 
its convoluted history spanning more 
than two decades. This phase marks 
massive repatriation of peoples back 
to regions once their homelands of 
their parents. This phase follows that 
introduced with the Comprehensive 
Plan of Action in March 1989, which 
incorporated a screening process to de- 
termine refugee status of new arrivals 
from that point forward. 
The present phase represents the 
participation not only of the countries 
of asylum but more importantly the 
countries of return-Laos, Cambodia 
and Vietnam-in a "normalization" of 
relation among states. The political 
implication in each state differs, but 
overall it is intended that returnees 
become stakeholders in the larger 
process of redevelopment of the coun- 
try. The states of Laos, Cambodia and 
Vietnam for their part become part- 
ners in a developmental process. If 
successful, not only will these coun- 
tries take their place with others in the 
region as growing economies, but hu- 
man rights will be an integral part of 
this development. 
Laos 
For Laos, development involves the re- 
patriation of the majority of Lowland 
Lao and Hmong hilltribes people. Al- 
though the official estimated number 
in camps is some 51,512 persons, only 
11,244 were counted as returns by the 
end of 1992. The schedule calls for the 
return to be complete by the end of 
1994. 
While in comparison with other 
countries, this number appears small, 
the process is in reality quite intricate, 
involving transitions for two distinct 
ethnic groups and challenges to the 
developmental economy . 
Thailand for its part is eager to has- 
ten the departure. It has closed several 
refugee camps, including the large 
northeastern Thailand Hmong camp, 
Ban Vinai, in November 1992. Then 
some 9,000 Hmong were transferred 
to a long-established mixed camp, Ban 
Nam Pho, now called a "repatriation 
centre" in the same region. 
Yet the enthusiasm for return to 
Laos appears mixed at best. The 
Vientiane government is willing to 
provide a modest allotment to return- 
ing groups of seven acres of land, farm 
equipment and rice consignment. Its 
interest focuses upon repopulating the 
rural areas for agrarian development. 
Much less enthusiasm exists for pro- 
spective urban returnees, and no in- 
centive is awarded for settlement 
there. 
Lowland Laotians stillin camp view 
the invitations to return as a joint move 
on the part of Bangkok and Vientiane. 
Knowing that they have "overstayed 
their welcome" in Thailand, they are 
uncertain that an amnesty effectively 
exists. In a conversation with the infor- 
mal leader of Camp Ban Nam Pho, who 
with his wife had spent 17 years there, 
he resisted possibilities of joining his 
son or daughter, now resettled in 
North America, because he wished to 
return "home." Yet because of his in- 
volvement with the U.S. armed forces 
during the war, he could not be certain 
that even a near two-decade hiatus 
would be sufficient to cause retribu- 
tory action to fade.' 
Hmong, Reticence 
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The Hmong retain a deep distrust of 
the Vientiane government and are re- 
sisting resettlement. In an survey con- 
ducted among the Hmong in Ban Vinai 
camp, Rab6 (1990) found that none of 
the members wished to return. Rather, 
they remain suspicious even if the gov- 
ernment might guarantee personal 
safety and economic freedom. As the 
spectre of return appears closer, re- 
quests for third-country resettlement 
(mainly the U.S.) have augmented. 
Likewise, unknown numbers have dis- 
appeared, presumably into the north- 
ern hills of Thailand, where extended 
kin may be found and the agricultural 
region is somewhat similar. 
The socialist Lao government in- 
tends to continue to develop agricul- 
ture as its principal economic base. As 
such the return of former citizens is an 
attractive prospect. The government 
appears in no haste to mount training 
programs for its agricultural econo- 
mists and planners, however. Al- 
though the Thai university system has 
offered to collaborate in planning such 
programs tailored to specifications, 
university officials have not received 
warm enthusiasm from their opposite 
numbers in Laos. Nevertheless, infor- 
mation exchanges continue, and there 
is no sign of deterioration of relations. 
Thai and other international officials 
are far less eager, however, to assist 
underground agents in facilitating the 
new route for drug trafficking now 
passing through the northwest of Laos. 
Apparently a substitute for routes 
through Cambodia, the new route ex- 
tends the flow of hard currency into 
Laotian coffers and makes this venture 
extremely difficult to extinguish. 
Cambodia 
Movement to the "final" phase was 
signalled by the commencement of re- 
turn in early fall 1992 of more than 
300,000 Cambodians from border 
camps. Strictly speaking, most 
returnees from this protracted exodus 
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of more than 15 years were not even 
considered refugees; rather they were 
displaced in "temporary" camps. This 
form of diplomatic newspeak perhaps 
foreshadowed even more ambiguity 
upon return. 
The much-delayed return of Cam- 
bodian refugees has added to the 
frustration felt by the Thai government 
in serving as a "temporary" asylum for 
refugee groups from the three South- 
east Asian countries for nearly two 
decades of a retarded Western resettle- 
ment program since the mid-80s 
(Rogge, 1991, Tasker, 1990). Threats of 
closure of Cambodian camps have 
posed problems for international plans 
as well as for Cambodians who ill- 
appreciate their buffer position on the 
Southeast Asian political game board 
that the Cambodian camp situation 
has been the best financed and staffed 
of any among the current world refu- 
gees. Rogge (1990) notes that the array 
of NGO services has been the most 
extensive and of longest duration on 
record>This asset may well turn into a 
liability upon return, however. 
Financing and bgistics of Return 
At long last, however, this repatriation 
campaign may be one of the most suc- 
cessful yet launched by the UNHCR, 
with some 92 per cent of the $84.3 mil- 
lions sought being pledged by August, 
1992, by more than 30 donor countries 
and organizations (UNHCR, 1992). 
Projects range from the community- 
oriented to assistance for individual 
farmers. Moreover, in the late 1980s 
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(Muntarbhorn, 1990). The disappear- 
ance of the Thai government's patient 
attitude toward the self-serving dual 
politics of resettlement and repatria- 
tion by Western states and inter- 
national organizations increased 
pressure for repatriation, whatever the 
outcome for refugees. 
Helton (1992) dist inguishes 
between the desirability of repatria- 
tion and the conditions under which it 
occurs. There is little question that 
many host countries would welcome 
the relief of not having to continue har- 
bouring large cohorts of refugees. An 
important component of a return proc- 
ess is the assurance against retribution: 
a return with "safety and dignity" 
(Ibid.). While there can be no fast guar- 
antee of assured protection, the main 
safeguards are the unrestrained access 
of NGOs and UNHCR to the returnees 
and the elimination of "attendant 
risks": both physical (mines) and 
political, absence of armed hostilities 
which would precipitate another 
round of persecution. 
The irony of an uncertain return ap- 
pears even starker in light of the fact 
there appeared to be a fit between the 
timing of projects, funding and move- 
ment of peoples, so that initial move- 
ment logistics were effected with an 
unusual degree of efficiency. 
Nevertheless, prospects for success 
for the massive return of Cambodians 
are now shrouded in uncertainty at 
best. By late 1992, the "peace plan" so 
optimistically heralded less than a year 
prior appeared in political tatters. The 
Khmer Rouge declined cooperation 
with the Red Cross and violated cease- 
fire agreements. For their part, the 
other forces, including the State of 
Cambodia has lacked instruments of 
governance, so that services in health, 
agriculture, education have virtually 
collapsed instead of being bolstered 
(Jantzen, 1993). 
Political organization has further 
deteriorated with the vacillation of the 
key solidarity-building symbol, Prince 
Sihanouk, with respect to his partici- 
pation in party and government-build- 
ing. The political conditions for the 
returnees from Thailand certainly lack 
the kind of stability upon which a mas- 
sive reinsertion depends. 
Characteristics of Camp 
Population (late 1990) 
Over a third of the large camps is com- 
posed of children under 10 years of age 
(Rogge, 1990, Thorn, 1991). Not only is 
the dependency ratio unusually high 
therefore, but the ratio represents a co- 
hort of children who know nothing of 
their homeland, nor life, outside the 
camps. Clearly, these young persons 
will face repatriation as a type of immi- 
gration. Familial rdles perforce will 
change from camplife without a refer- 
ence point for these young children. 
Vulnerable Females 
In a comprehensive study of Cambo- 
dian camplife, Thorn (1991) operation- 
ally defined women "vulnerable" if 
they fell into one of the following cat- 
egories: a handicapped husband or 
widows with children or lone women. 
They form about 13 per cent of the total 
camp household population (Thorn, 
1991). Females are heads in 21 per cent 
of camp households. Vulnerable 
women in camp are further impeded 
by low skill level: 78 per cent have no 
skills at all, while the remainder have 
some skills in small business. Only a 
third (predominantly the younger) are 
literate enough to read large-print text. 
(aid.). 
For the refugees themselves, camp 
personnel reported that such concerns 
as how child care would be assumed, 
whether relatives would help; what 
kind of work one might perform were 
ill-considered. Some two out of three 
did not know where relatives might be 
found (Ibid.). 
A decade or more of camplife has 
blurred network lines and blunted 
some of the harsh day-to-day house- 
hold choices. Prospective returnees 
expect that (UNHCR, Cambodian) 
government will provide necessities 
for resumption: food, tools, medical 
assistance. 
In Cambodia, the Women's Asso- 
ciation of Cambodia (WAC) is attempt- 
ing to re-establish networks, develop 
self-help groups and to set up local 
credit-union schemes to assist all 
women, although this would be of es- 
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pecial significance to vulnerable 
women. They propose a code of ideals: 
hard work, literacy and education; co- 
operative solidarity, child-rearing, 
family harmony. This type of construc- 
tive networking appears critical to 
reintegration, given the paucity of con- 
tacts between returning refugees and 
relatives remaining in Cambodia. 
Sinnois (1990) observes that the WAC'S 
sharing experiences would allow 
women "from both sides" to learn 
from each other and to be efficient pro- 
gram implementors during 
reintegration and reconstruction 
phases. This optimistic scenario is 
predicated upon a peaceful milieu for 
return, however. Otherwise, the or- 
ganizations and women whom they 
serve would be politicized, with little 
attention to the original purpose. 
There is a significant number of un- 
accompanied minors (between 1,000 
to 4,000, a number in dispute [Rogge, 
1990]), who, lacking kinship ties and 
parental guidance, so important in 
Cambodian society, will require 
special assistance in any form of 
reintegration. Many may have sur- 
vived both physically and socially to 
this point through the infusion of camp 
social services; no such extension will 
necessarily occur after repatriation. 
A certain amount of spontaneous 
return has occurred, estimated from 
50,000 to 100,000 returnees. These 
returnees consist mainly of some ma- 
ture males, returning to kin and 
reassuming a rural lifestyle; the other 
group would consist of youthful males 
with experience in border-running 
and vigilante activities. These youths 
typically seek an urban setting for their 
"street-smarts" (Rogge, 1990). The lat- 
ter group especially poses a serious 
problem of reintegration into civil 
society and may well constitute a new 
"underlife" in Cambodia. 
Impediments and Remedies 
Lackof arable land. Although a UNHCR 
land-identification mission reported 
finding some 240,000 hectares of "po- 
tentially arable l a n d  in the western 
provinces, where most of the returnee 
population is expected to relocate, this 
allotment was both insufficient and, 
more important, inappropriate for dis- 
tribution. 
Cambodian custom calls for land 
being distributed at the district level, 
so that any centralized plans are 
doomed from the inception (Robinson, 
1992). Upon further inspection, the 
available land turned out to be unsuit- 
able for agricultural use or mined. 
Yet the non-trivial result of the addi- 
tion of the cash assistance option was a 
dramatic increase in the number of 
returnees, averaging some 30,000 per 
month since July, 1992 (Bid.). 
Kinship reunification. The distribution 
of returnees has spread well across the 
country, with only some 55 per cent 
opting for the Battambang region. The 
remainder have taken advantage of 
special trains for Phnom Penh and the 
east. While initial resettlement does 
Overall, the Cambodian 
final phase is a chapter still 
to be written, with many 
sub-plots, both political and 
social. In sheer logistical 
terms, it represents one of 
the most important move- 
ments of the era. 
not guarantee continuation of the 
trend, by November, 1992, some 35,000 
returnees have located east of Phnom 
Penh. That number is somewhat 
smaller than expected from projections 
by birthplace, which indicated that 
some 100,000 returnees came from 
eastern regions (Ibid.). Nevertheless, 
returnees are frequently relocating 
with kin in hometown regions. There 
appears little initial problem of absorp- 
tion of returnees in the more sparsely 
populated central and eastern regions. 
That trend competes to some extent 
with the undeniable attraction of 
larger cities, especially Phnom Penh. 
Reports from western city of 
Battambang indicate that effects of the 
highly orchestrated UN effort per- 
sisted beyond the expected few weeks. 
Returnees have continued to enjoy 
UN-provided benefits and appear to 
expect the lingering institutional pres- 
ence (Ibid.). Their location has usually 
been determined by proximity to the 
food distribution centre, with the cash 
allotment facilitating initial adapta- 
tion. Whether additional "welfare 
safety nets" can be supplied as the al- 
lotments are exhausted remains an 
open question. Little evidence of re- 
placing the UN rations was evident in 
the early stages (Bid.). 
Financingand logistics of return. Formi- 
dable challenges remain, however. Lit- 
eracy rates are low, especially among 
women. Health practices remain tied 
to traditional methods for women, 
which fail to include modern hygienic 
conditions surrounding pregnancy 
and childbirth. Not only is infant mor- 
tality high even in hospitals (9 per 
1,000) but lack of knowledge about 
sanitary practices leads to complica- 
tions in normal aftercare. 
Most adult householders in camp 
expressed an interest in returning to 
farming jobs upon return (Rogge, 
1990). In light of the long absence from 
the land, this profile appears highly 
optimistic. Of further concern, the 
amount of land to be distributed far 
underreaches demand. Land mines 
still punctuate the countryside, to add 
to the peril. Rogge (1990, Ch. 9) notes 
that while some agricultural training 
took place in camps, none offered 
marketing techniques required for 
current-day practices. Occupational 
alternatives may therefore widen, 
despite the predominant iinterests in 
farming. Returnees may seekopportu- 
nities in urban areas in far greater 
numbers than anticipated. 
Participation in the commercial 
economy appears limited for women 
to food-related areas: small shop-keep- 
in& selling fresh foods, etc. There ap- 
pears no easy entry to work in areas of 
higher commerce or bureaucracy with- 
out special training, of which most 
women are deprived. (Sonnois, 1990, 
pp. 4-7). 
The informal commercial sector ap- 
pears to be the only point of entry, 
especially for those returning to urban 
areas. While profiteering is possible, it 
is even more likely that labour will be 
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purchased for the lowest possible 
price. Nor can any safeguards for 
women's security be assured. Exploi- 
tation both of work-related and sexual 
varieties is possible if not likely. 
Overall, the Cambodian final phase 
is a chapter still to be written, with 
many sub-plots, both political and so- 
cial. In sheer logistical terms, it repre- 
sents one of the most important 
movements of the era. While timed to 
fit the larger political agenda of the 
first country-wide election in Cambo- 
dian history, the social dilemmas of 
return to a homeland with a new gen- 
eration of children who remember 
nothing but border camplife stand as 
stark challenges. Yet in Cambodia's 
fractious and terrifying history, this ex- 
perience represents another milestone. 
Vietnam 
Of the waves from the three Southeast 
Asian states, the largest by far has been 
the Vietnamese, as indicated in Table 
1. In 1992 the UNHCR counted some 
101,444 Vietnamese in camps scattered 
in nine countries throughout eastern 
Asia from Korea to Indonesia, with 
half that number harboured in Hong 
Kong camps and detention centres. To 
date, they represent the largest group 
still detained in camps. 
The proportion of asylum-seekers 
being "screened in" as refugees has 
hovered about the 12 percent mark, or 
about 1,200 cases per year. With the 
introduction of the CPA agreement in 
1989, countries of first asylum, espe- 
cially but not exclusively Hong Kong, 
have been pressing Vietnamese asy- 
lum-seekers not to disembark from 
their boat voyage to presumed safe 
harbour. If the new arrivals insisted, 
they were accorded the very minimum 
of privileges in a regime which repre- 
sents detention, rather than asylum. 
The graphic narrative of Joe Thomas 
and the survey of Loughry et al., in this 
issue provide a well-rounded account 
of the recent past and current state of 
affairs in Hong Kong. Suffice it that the 
chances of gaining refugee status have 
diminished to the very minimal. 
In early 1992, amvals by boat dra- 
matically ceased; by comparison, some 
20,200 asylum-seekers arrived in Hong 
Kong harbour in 1991. Complete de- 
tails to explain this change are still a 
matter of some guesswork. Doubtless 
some boats were peremptorily turned 
back as they attempted to enter Hong 
Kong waters. It is also likely that sig- 
nals from traditional resettlement 
countries have been interpreted as 
unambiguously negative. Word of the 
multiple disincentives administered 
by the Hong Kong authorities must 
have spread widely throughout the 
community of would-be departures in 
Vietnam. 
Resettlement 
Overall, more than 730,000 Vietnam- 
ese have been resettled since 1975. Of 
this total, resettlement activity has ab- 
sorbed about 8,500 refugees per year 
recently, a significant diminution from 
the earlier rates2 These numbers are 
governed by the overall CPA quota 
agreements as well as by local factors 
of eligibility determination. As some 
countries, such as the U.S., re-apply 
refugee determination criteria, and all 
countries select according to various 
criteria of suitability for resettlement, 
the numbers selected reflect local pri- 
orities. At present Canada has more 
than filled its commitment of 9,400 
refugees with a total to date of nearly 
12,000 refugees. The United States has 
committed 18,799 resettlements, of 
which just over 16,000 have been filled. 
With the dramatic cessation of arrivals 
and the end of the CPA arrangements 
in 1994, it may be expected that 
resettlements will taper this year and 
next as well. 
A special problem for resettlement 
is the return of large number of unac- 
companied minors, formally so classi- 
fied as being under age 16 upon arrival. 
The number has varied from a year to 
year low of 2,000 to a high of 4,000 
children. Some are attached to an adult 
caregiver; yet their screening is inde- 
pendent. Normally the child is 
screened on a priority basis, about 90 
percent of whom are screened out and 
scheduled for return to Vietnam. If 
there is a caregiver attached to this 
screened-out minor, s l  heimmediately 
distances herlhimself from the child, 
so as not to dim herlhis own chances 
for qualifying for status. Thus the child 
is isolated both in departure and in the 
aftermath. Even though screened out 
for return, they languish in detention 
centres for months, awaiting an uncer- 
tain future without being able to affect 
it. Some unaccompanied minors have 
been in Hong Kong long enough to 
cross the age 16 upper limit. Their sta- 
tus is redefined to that of adult, even 
though they lack physical and psycho- 
logical resources normally expected of 
adults to withstand the harsh 
conditions. 
Of no less concern is whether 
women will be able to return, what- 
ever the future may hold. They have 
found conditions in the camp extraor- 
dinarily harsh. Daily life is fraught 
with difficulties, from the lack of sani- 
Table 1: Southeast Asian Refugees and Asylum Seeker, 1975-1992 
Arrivals Resettlement Repatriation Camp Pop'n 
1975-92 1975-92 1975-92 late 1992# 
Laos 364,889 302,133 11,244 51,512 
Cambodiab 260,647 234,014 14,612 12,021 
Vietnam 860,149 730,604 28,101 101,444 
Total 1,485,685 1,266,751 53,957 164,977 
a This count includes asylum-seekers, t h e  who have been 'screened out" as well as refugees 
in the camps throughout Southeast Asia. 
b This count does not include those considered "displaced, " who were not in official UNHCR 
camps. The latter number represents another, 100,000 persons who by late 1992 returned to 
Cambodia. 
Source: UNHCR, Geneva, September, 1992. 
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tary hygienic products to the instru- 
mental use of sexual favours and mar- 
riage-of-convenience in order to gain 
some chance of exit. The latter appears 
necessary in part because many 
women have been passed over in the 
(already badly flawed) screening 
process. 
Vietnam, Development 
In some cases development assistance 
has been specifically directed to re- 
gions producing large numbers of boat 
people and those to which many asy- 
lum seekers will return. This direction 
in an erratic economic system, where 
local and expatiate Vietnamese and 
foreigners continue alongside central- 
ized economic planning, appears as 
one of the few specific sources of state 
assistance. 
As Vietnam receives more returnees 
and more foreign investors seeking fi- 
nancial opportunities, the Vietnamese 
legal structure as well shows signs of 
needing overhaul, despite recent at- 
tempts to reform. Codes for civil, com- 
mercial and labour law as well as 
regulations to adjudicate disputes are 
being formulated. But most of all, rais- 
ing of awareness of law in the context 
of changing notions of democracy re- 
mains a problem in light of increasing 
incidents of corruption and smug- 
gling. Vietnam will have to depend 
upon a wide-ranging public education 
program to instill respect and mini- 
mize cynicism (Murray Hiebert, 
"Miles to go," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 29 July, 1993,24-26). 
Notwi ths tanding impor tant  
changes pending for commercial legal 
undertakings, human rights climate 
has oscillated from harsh to the milder 
and back. Observers have cited peri- 
ods of relative freedom both in politi- 
cal debate and in treatment of 
dissidents, followed by periods of sur- 
veillance and oppression (Murray 
Hiebert, "No middle path here," Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 5 August, 
1993,26). 
Returnees to Vietnam receive some 
US250 per adult with promises of as- 
sistance and non-retribution for activi- 
ties associated with their departure. 
Reportedly, much of the allotment is 
spent on ration cards, and some local 
indebtedness, so that little if any re- 
mains for providing a base for resettle- 
ment. Unemployment is high despite 
important attempts of the government 
to restore agricultural productivity 
and build a transportation and com- 
munication infrastructure. 
Asylees complain that, while the na- 
tional government has long aban- 
doned petty harassment of returnees 
in favour of economic planning and 
other society-wide pursuits, local dis- 
tricts continue to exercise discrimina- 
tion and exclusion against those 
connected with the previous govern- 
ment or those who are suspected to 
continue to foster political dialogue or 
sentiments considered antithetical to 
approved socialist ideology. With- 
holding privileges is accompanied by 
still-widespread bribery practices as 
means of obtaining what might other- 
wise be accorded as a matter of right 
(Murray Hiebert, "Serving hard time, " 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 July, 
1993,26). 
There have been important changes 
in attitude toward repatriates at the 
national level in Vietnam. While there 
seems to be an even-handed approach 
to the treatment of returnees, corre- 
sponding changes have not occurred 
at the local level, where as many as 25 
security officers are reputed working 
in a community of 2,500 members. Lo- 
cal surveillance and discrimination 
appears to be harking back to earlier 
days. 
While international observers peri- 
odically scrutinize the overall system, 
it is much more difficult to examine the 
local level, where the difficulties ap- 
pear to be more far-reaching and re- 
quiring investigation well beyond the 
capacity of short-range site visits. 
Yet two factors may bring an impor- 
tant change. Various investments con- 
tinue to be made, both in terms of 
macro development, as the United 
States has implicitly lifted its ban on 
investment on the part of its corporate 
citizens and in terms of specific invest- 
ment in economic development by the 
EC and smaller national units (includ- 
ing Canada's CIDA). ~ h e r e b ~ ,  a wid- . 
ening financial base provides incen- 
tive to create jobs for all community 
inhabitants, including returnees. Cor- 
respondingly, returnees will invari- 
ably return in greater numbers, given 
the CPA timetable which terminates 
by the end of 1994. It would be simplest 
for the national Vietnam government 
to get on with the task of national 
(re)construction. Returnees can repre- 
sent an asset in this formidable 
agenda. 
Notes 
1. Personal field notes. 
2. These estimates are based upon data 
compiled by the UNHCR in September, 
1992. 
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